Five Chinese weapons of war America should fear

Chinese Soldier

Chinese Soldier

American bimonthly The National Interest asks in its recent article titled “Five Chinese Weapons of War America Should Fear” –  “China’s economy is on the rise – and so is its military. Should Washington be concerned?” and says:

In the last twenty years, China has quickly ascended from a regional to global military power. A generation ago, the People’s Liberation Army was armed with antiquated weapons and oriented towards a manpower-intensive “People’s War”. In the intervening period China has gone from a green to blue water navy, the air force is actively developing so-called fifth-generation fighters, and the army has been extensively modernized.

A vast array of new Chinese weapons are under development, some alarming in their potential.

China’s neighbors and the United States are observing China’s buildup with interest and concern. China is showing itself to be particularly interested in projecting military power in support of territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. Weapons that empower China to take decisive military action in support of such claims could escalate a regional crisis into a larger one involving Washington.

China recognizes the potential for conflict with the United States, however small, and is planning accordingly. China is pouring resources into weapons specifically designed to target American forces and limit their ability to operate near the Chinese mainland. These “anti-access, area-denial” (A2/AD) weapons have the potential to exclude American forces from China’s innermost defense zone: the so-called “First Island Chain” consisting of the Kuril Islands, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Borneo.

The chances of a shooting war between China and the United States are remote, and neither is set on war with the other. However, the extent to which the interests contradict or compete with each another means war cannot be entirely ruled out. With that in mind, here are the five Chinese weapons the United States fears most.

DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile

The most dangerous weapon to U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region is the Dong Feng-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). Somewhat prematurely dubbed “the Carrier Killer”, the DF-21D is a medium-range ballistic missile specifically designed to attack American aircraft carriers, skirting the defenses of a U.S. naval task force to attack ships from above at hypersonic speeds.

DF-21D is a land-based system, with an estimated range of up to 1,500+km. Once launched, the missile would release a reentry vehicle traveling at speeds of up to Mach 10-12. The resulting velocity and kinetic energy—to say nothing of the reentry vehicle’s payload—would cause serious damage to even the largest naval vessels. Nobody knows for sure, but it is believed direct hits from a DF-21D could be enough to put an aircraft carrier out of action, or even sink it.

Mounted on a wheeled transporter and launcher, the DF-21D would be road-mobile and thus extremely hard to locate before launch. The reentry vehicle’s hypersonic speed would make it difficult—but not impossible—to shoot down.

The DF-21D has an Achilles’ heel, the so-called “kill chain” of sensors, relay stations, and command and control centers required to detect, identify, track, and hit a ship with a ballistic missile. There are many links in the chain leading to a successful DF-21D launch, and breaking just one would interrupt the entire process.

China would have to devote considerable reconnaissance assets to killing a carrier and maritime surveillance is not China’s strong suit. Land-based, over-the-horizon radars are imprecise, and maritime patrol aircraft, UAVs and submarines will be vulnerable to the carrier’s air wing. Only China’s satellites have the ability to provide tracking data, and those can be jammed or otherwise disabled.

The DF-21D was allegedly tested in early 2013, when two craters were observed in an outline of an aircraft carrier in the Gobi Desert.

The DF-21D weapon may be operational, but the kill chain is likely not, and it may be years before the entire system is fully operational. Still, the prospect of a weapon that can kill 5,600 Americans, destroy seventy aircraft, and destroy a pillar of American power projection worldwide is a sobering one to contemplate.

Note: In a test in 2012, DF-21D successfully hit and sank a simulated model of aircraft carrier and it is now in service (see my post “Suspected Test of DF-21D Anti-ship Missile that Has Already Been in Service” on January 18)

Chengdu J-20 Fighter

China’s first fifth-generation fighter, the J-20 is a large, twin-engine aircraft currently in the demonstrator phase. The J-20’s mission set is unknown, but the aircraft’s robust design seems to support it going in a number of different directions. The aircraft promises to be long-range, fast- and low-observable—if not outright stealthy. China has built three prototypes, the latest flew in early March 2014. The aircraft is projected to enter service some time around 2020.

A striking, delta-winged design complemented by large forward canards and a twin tail, the J-20 is China’s most ambitious aircraft project ever. The aircraft is speculated to mount a modern AESA phased array radar, an electro-optical targeting system. The two large internal weapons bays could conceivably carry a payload of air-to-air, land attack or anti-ship missiles.

The most obvious role for the J-20 is as an air superiority fighter. The J-20’s long range means the fighter can operate farther off China’s coast, intercepting attack and bomber aircraft including F/A-18 fighter bombers and B-1 and B-2 bombers. As a long-range fighter, the J-20 could also patrol disputed territories, particularly in support of China’s recently declared Air Defense Identification Zone.

China could also use the J-20 to target American support aircraft. Airborne early warning aircraft such as the E-3 Sentry and E-2C Hawkeye and aerial refueling aircraft such as the KC-135 and KC-130 are key assets that allow American forces to operate at long ranges. J-20 fighters equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles could attempt to shoot these aircraft down, crippling American and allied air forces.

Another possible role for the J-20 would be to attack American ships and bases in the Asia-Pacific. Groups of radar-evading J-20 fighters carrying land-attack missiles could precede a Chinese conventional ballistic missile strike, taking out American surface-to-air missile batteries, air bases, radar stations, and command and control targets across the Pacific. The strike would suppress American defenses and pave the way for conventional ballistic missiles strikes.

Time will tell what direction—or directions—the J-20 will take. Not knowing what the J-20 is designed to do, however, is an unwelcome unknown in a world with a twenty-year lead time on fighter jets.

Anti-Satellite Weaponry

For decades, American space-based military assets have given U.S. forces a considerable advantage on the battlefield. Satellites are essential to the American way of war. This is especially true in the Asia-Pacific, where distances from the continental United States are measured in thousands of miles.

China has at least an operational weapon, the SC-19. A derivative of the DF-21, the SC-19 ballistic missile is equipped with the KT-2 (a kinetic kill vehicle). Launched into space, the KT-2 is guided to target by infrared sensors. The KT-2 does not have an explosive warhead but destroys enemy satellites by colliding with them.

In 2007, a KT-2 struck and destroyed an aging Chinese satellite. In May 2013 China launched what it described as a “sounding rocket” carrying high-altitude experiments. U.S. intelligence believes that this was actually an SC-19/KT-2 test. The SC-19 is believed to be capable of reaching medium earth orbit, which would put American GPS navigation satellites at risk.

Chinese ASAT weapons could target a variety of American satellites, including intelligence collection, communications, and navigation satellites. The loss of such satellites would make it difficult to perform reconnaissance missions over China. It would also interfere with air, land and sea navigation, slow communications, and prevent the use of GPS-guided weapons.

Evidence suggests that China intends to put the SC-19 missile on wheeled transporters and launchers. With more than 1.86 million miles of paved roads in China, locating and destroying mobile Chinese ASAT weapons would be extremely difficult.

The use of anti-satellite weaponry by China in any future conflict would be roundly denounced. Still, as dependent as U.S. forces are on satellites the temptation to take the first shot in space would be difficult to resist.

Type 071 Landing Platform Dock

Power projection is becoming increasingly important to China, particularly to enforce territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. China’s ability to land amphibious troops on some island chains such as the Senkaku, Paracel and Spratly islands could embolden the leadership to do exactly that.

China has three amphibious assault ships of the Type 071 class, Kunlunshan, Jinggangshan and Changbaishan. The three ships are what western naval observers would call China’s “Gator Navy”: ships designed to transport and land marines on hostile shores. Three more Type 071s are expected, as well as six amphibious ships with full-length flight decks like the American Wasp-class.

The three Type 071 ships were built by the Hudong-Zhonghua shipyards of Shanghai. Each ship displaces 20,000 tons and is nearly 700 feet long. The 071 class can transport up to a battalion of marines—roughly 400 to 800 troops—and up to eighteen armored vehicles.

The ships have a flight deck capable of simultaneously operating two W-9 troop-carrying helicopters, and can store another four in a large hangar. The ships also have a very long well deck that can store and launch amphibious vehicles, rigid-hulled inflatable boats, and four Chinese troop-carrying hovercraft similar to the American LCAC.

China’s 071 amphibious transports are based with China’s South Seas Fleet, where they can be used to intimidate—or invade—Taiwan. However, like Western navies, China has been quick to embrace their use in other roles. In addition to assaulting coastlines and islands, Gators can also serve in the command and control, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance roles. One transport, Jinggangshan, is currently in the Indian Ocean as part of the Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 recovery effort.

A lone amphibious ship such as Jinggangshan is not worrisome. However, it represents the kind of expeditionary capability that an adventurous China could use to escalate a territorial dispute into a very dangerous situation.

Offensive Cyber Operations

The People’s Liberation Army believes establishing “electronic dominance” early on is critical to their success in a future conflict. Of the five Chinese weapons that America fears the most, the most enigmatic is China’s ability to mount offensive cyber operations.

Offensive cyber operations are defined by a wide spectrum of activity, from psychological operations to destroying enemy equipment and infrastructure. China’s electronic army might achieve that dominance by include seizing control of communications networks, planting harmful software, and even conducting online disinformation campaigns. Offensive cyber is best used in conjunction with traditional military operations, to present another front. For example, Chinese cyber operations could disrupt enemy computer networks or jam enemy communications prior to an aircraft and missile attack.

Detached from traditional military ideas of operational range, Chinese offensive cyber operations could be used against military or civilian targets without regard to geographic location. Offensive cyber operations are also the only weapon on this list that can strike the American homeland.

China’s main cyber unit appears to be the General Staff Department, Third Department. Roughly analogous to the U.S. National Security Agency, the Third Department may have as many as 130,000 personnel, attached to Chinese military units, twelve operational bureaus, and three research institutes. Within the Third Department is the Second Bureau, also known as 61398 Unit, tasked for operations involving the United States.

According to the Project 2049 Institute the General Staff Department, Fourth Department, traditionally tasked with electronic warfare and signals collection, may be involved in offensive cyber operations. The People’s Liberation Army’s concept of “integrated network and electronic warfare” makes it clear that China considers jamming enemy computer networks and jamming battlefield electronics related activities. The Chinese military links cyber operations to traditional forms of electronic warfare in ways the United States often does not.

Despite the amount of manpower devoted to China’s cyber capabilities, capabilities remain relatively unsophisticated. There is no sign, for example, that China is capable of such offensive cyber weapons as Stuxnet. Desmond Ball, a professor at Australian National University, argues that China’s leadership is well aware of their shortcomings in cyber warfare and this has “led to the adoption of a pre-emptive strategy…in which China’s very destructive but relatively unsophisticated cyber-warfare capabilities are unleashed at the very outset of prospective conflicts.”

The United States may be a leader in Internet and networking technologies, but the rapid development pace of both means that potential exploits will be constant and ever-changing. As both technologies continue to penetrate American society and the U.S. Military, there will be more opportunities for an adversary to exploit the cyber realm in a future conflict.

War between the United States and China is not inevitable any more than war with the Soviet Union was inevitable. There are quite a few good reasons that a great power war is even less likely than it was during the Cold War, particularly the state of mutually beneficial economic interdependence between the United States and China. That China should develop weapons such as these shouldn’t be any great surprise; it is logical from their perspective to prepare to engage the United States even without the intention of war.

These five weapons do not make war more likely—rather, they may give self-conscious China the confidence to cooperate with its neighbors and the United States. Alternately, they may tempt China to decisively settle longstanding claims—or create new ones. One thing is for certain: they put the ball in China’s court.

Kyle Mizokami is a writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch. This is his debut article for The National Interest.

Source: The National Interest – “Five Chinese Weapons of War America Should Fear”

Categories: Defence & Aerospace

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6 replies

    • Defeating a Paper Tiger: Stopping China’s Military Rise.
      Will Jagdon Jr.

      Merriam-Webster Dictionary describes a paper tiger as one that is outwardly powerful or dangerous but inwardly weak or ineffective. China’s behavior in the South
      China Sea (SCS) towards its neighbors is an ominous sign of a rising
      power. In due course, China will stumble upon a sleeping giant in the Pacific, the U.S. But China’s strength of top-down, centralized operations can also be its greatest weakness. U.S. Global Integrated Operations (GIO), positioned throughout the Pacific Rim, are decentralized and exercise independent mission command with the freedom to employ any means necessary to defeat the enemy. According to Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom’s book, The Starfish and the Spider, centralized operations are like a spider, with the CEO at the top making all decisions. Decentralized operations resemble a starfish, with power distributed to its legs, flexible, ambiguous, and fluid. If history repeats itself in the SCS, and given China’s great technological advancement, initial salvos could have catastrophic effects similar to the surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor and the World Trade Center. Eventually, GIO will choke the Chinese military into submission.

      Background for a Showdown: U.S. Forward Deployment in Asia

      The U.S. change of strategy, the “Pivot,” towards a more assertive economic, military, and diplomatic push in Southeast Asia resulted after America realized[1]
      that the global economy had shifted toward the Pacific Rim, away from North
      America and the European Union. In 2010 the U.S. exported 51% of its goods and
      72% of its agricultural products to the Asian Pacific. American economists expect that by 2015, East Asian countries will surpass NAFTA and the Euro zones as the world’s largest trading bloc.[2] Failure to execute the Pivot results in greater strategic risk, to include loss of American strategic edge in political, economic, geographic, space, and cyberspace domains

      Another example of the need of U.S. involvement in Asia involves the “ring of fire,” an area referred to by PACOM as the most turbulent in the Pacific Region, where constant loss of lives and properties occur due to natural disasters, pandemics, war, and conflict.[3] Without U.S. presence and engagement, China fills the void, quickly excluding the U.S. military from any regional Asian Involvement.[4] Furthermore, China confirms its own assumptions of the U.S. as a declining world power similar to Rome, too exhausted to recover from its financial meltdown.[5] The U.S. Forward Deployment in Asia supported by GIO must dominate the region.

      The Dance of the Paper Tiger: China’s Rising Military

      Uncertainties posed by China’s growing presence and influence in Asia raise increasing concerns for the U.S. Improvements in China’s military
      posture and anti-access / area denial (A2 / AD) capabilities,[6] Chinese
      distrust of U.S. regional intentions, and aggressive territorial claims stir
      the evolving security dynamics in Asia, challenging U.S. national interests in
      cyberspace, space, and maritime security.

      China’s “fleet-in-being” strategy uses tactics that enable a weaker navy to deter or cripple an enemy’s attack capabilities.[7] Generating a misperception of strength, the overall Chinese strategy plans to inflict massive losses on U.S. forces within a short time span, raising doubts among the American public and allies about U.S. defensive capabilities. High casualties from an extended operation would create a condition averse to the American public similar to the Vietnam experience.

      Chinese A2 / AD tactics involve preemptive attacks designed to inflict severe damage on U.S. forces in the Western Pacific Theater of Operations (WPTO), keeping them out of range, disrupting command and control (C2), and limiting freedom of movement in the region.

      The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force and Navy play a crucial role, and their nuclear forces make an aggressor hesitate. If a Chinese aircraft carrier battle group counters the U.S. naval presence in the SCS, it focuses on anti-air and anti-surface warfare capabilities. The primary tools involve a large submarine fleet, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and fast attack craft armed with anti-ship missiles.[8] It targets U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) with the sole purpose of destroying an aircraft carrier.

      The PLA Air Force integrates air-space early warning and provides ballistic missile defenses. More importantly, it introduces new medium-range surface-to-air missiles (SAM), long range H-6 bombers, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles which can attack with a conventional or nuclear payload.[9] Its anti-satellite system (ASAT) proves capable of hitting targets in space, a ground breaking achievement for future killer satellites, space-based anti-ballistic missiles, and space landmines.[10] At the same time, Chinese stealth-type fighter aircraft J-20[11]
      and China’s Dong Feng-21D “carrier killer” anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)
      system can reach Mach 10-12, annihilating naval defenses.[12]

      GIO’s response to China’s rise involves a new operational design concept based on a fleet dispersal model, leveraged basing arrangements with allies and partners, organized low signature cyber operations against a more tailored threat, and cross-domain operations involving surface, air, maritime, cyber, and space resources. The fleet dispersal model complicates the Chinese’s intelligence gathering operations and ability to react to movement of forces from multiple locations. The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) directs the U.S. military to rebalance with emphasis on operating in A2 / AD regions in order for the U.S. to maintain its ability to project power and influence.[13] The Chairman Strategic Direction to the Joint Force (CSDJF) guides the Army, Navy, and the Marines to hold service-unique strengths and build capabilities that do not exist until combined as a joint task force.[14]

      A parallel model, the Air Sea Battle Concept (ASBC), counters China’s A2 / AD strategy, which challenge U.S. freedom of action in the SCS.[15] The ASBC requires joint integration of air and naval forces to network integrated attacks in depth to destroy the A2 / AD capabilities.[16] With bases and prepositioned assets geographically dispersed throughout the Pacific Rim, a strategic space exists where initial salvoes of Chinese anti-warship ballistic or cruise missiles may or may not deliver decisive blows. In addition, the time span for missiles to cross the space creates a window of opportunity for the Chinese to hesitate, allowing the allies to conduct cross domain operations with anti-satellite (ANSAT) missiles targeting Chinese GPS satellites.
      The Joint Force must use ASBC to help set the conditions at the operational level to sustain a stable, favorable conventional military balance in the Pacific Region.[17] ASBC supports U.S. treaties and arrangements to defend allies and partners in the region.[18] Allies such as Japan and Australia play important enabling and supporting roles in SCS.[18] he Joint Force coordinates with Allies in Asia in response to China’s ASAT system. Working with the U.S., Japan provides counter ASAT capabilities.[20]

      Basing arrangements with allies and partners provides flexibility and leverages multiple capabilities to overwhelm the Chinese.[21] PACOM’s permanent based forces operate from South Korea and Japan. The fast U.S. littoral ships in Singapore
      provide around the clock coverage along the shallow shores of the SCS. Once reinforced by a carrier strike group (CSG), the combined force could choke the Malacca Strait, Chinese’s strategic weakness.[22] Strategic locations in Hawaii, Japan, and Australia provide adequate forces in the event of a land war. Dispersed units in the Pacific include the Eighth Army in South Korea; one Stryker Army Brigade in the Big Island of Hawaii; the U.S. Seventh Fleet in Yokosuka;[23]
      20,000 U.S. Marines in Okinawa; 5,000 Marines in Guam; 2,500 in Australia; and
      1,500 in Hawaii. In addition, increasing numbers of U.S. ships operating from
      Australian bases and the Army’s I Corps at Joint Base Lewis-McChord provide
      regionally aligned forces to the Pacific with varied missions to include conventional operations, special operations, humanitarian operations, Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), piracy and pandemic response.[24]

      The Joint Force organizes to the Chinese threat by integrating Japan and Korea into its aggression-projection means (integrated war-fighting), which include missile advanced warning systems to detect incoming missiles.[25] Japan provides robust Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations directed against Chinese activities, combat formations, and cyber threats.

      Joint Force Air Force and Navy provide multiple attack options to include the Air Force long-range penetrating strike operations with stealth bombers to destroy PLA ground-based long-range maritime surveillance systems. The Navy’s submarine-based and carrier-based ISR strike the PLA Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) to make them ineffective. Navy Aegis ships supplement anti missile-defense assets in support of allies.[26]

      Low signature capabilities such as cyberspace counter China’s cyber war specialists. Joint Force cyber response includes surgical and mass-based attacks to carry out its intended effect of mass disruption and full systems breakdowns.[27] In combination with lethal and kinetic combat operations, the overall net negative effects overwhelm the Chinese military.[28]

      Since the PLA relies on its anti-ship missiles arsenal and ASAT operations against U.S. CSG and satellites, the Joint Force space cross-domain operations allow its ground-launched ASAT missiles to destroy GPS and ASAT space systems, making their anti-ship missiles vulnerable and less accurate.[29]

      In sum, even if the Chinese successfully initiate a battle in the Pacific, its greatest strength is also its greatest weakness: centralized operations. GIO synergy, with cross domain operations including surface, air, maritime, cyber, and space resemble a starfish’s legs, each with its own decentralized and mission command
      operations, choking China’s PLA into submission.



      [1] Edwin Rueda, “Engagement in Southeast Asia,” Marine Corp Gazette, 96, no. 8 (August 2012): 1.

      [2] David Barno, Nora Bensahel, and Travis Sharp, “Pivot but Hedge: A Strategy for Pivoting to Asia While Hedging in the Middle East,” Orbis, 56, no. 2 (January 2012):

      [3] Paul McLeary, “Westward Expansion,” Army Times, October 25, 2012, 13.

      [4] Rueda, “Engagement in Southeast Asia,” 1.

      [5] Kevin Rudd, “Beyond the Pivot,” Foreign
      Affairs, (March / April 2013): 9.

      [6] Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, “Air-Sea Battle: A Point of Departure Operational Concept,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, (May 18, 2010): xii.

      [7] Robert Rubel, “Command of the Sea, an Old Concept Resurfaces in a New Form,” Naval War College Review, 65, no. 4 (1986): 27.

      [8] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress. Military and Security Development Involving People’s Republic of China 2012, (Washington, D.C: Office of Secretary of Defense, May 2012), iv.

      [9] Tol and Krepenevich, “Air-Sea Battle,” xii.

      [10] Paul Oh, “Assessing Chinese Intentions for the Military Use of the Space
      Domain,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 64 (1 QTR, 2012): 94.

      [11] Kyle Mizokami, The National Interest, Five Chinese Weapons of War America Should Fear (2014); 7May14.

      [12] Dean Cheng, “Chinese Military Modernization: The Future is Arriving Much Sooner Than Expected,” December 30, 2010 Web Memo, (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, no 3090 (2010): 1.

      [13] Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 2010), 8.

      [14] Martin Dempsey, Chairman Strategic Direction to the Joint Force, (Washington, DC.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 2012) 7.

      [15] Lowell Ditmer, “Asia in 2011: Transition?” Asian Survey 52, no. 1 (January/February 2012): 1.

      [16] Philip Dupree and Jordan Thomas, “Air-Sea Battle: Clearing the Fog,” Armed Forces Journal, (May 2012): 2.

      [17] Tol and Krepenevich, “Air-Sea Battle,” xiii.

      [18] Ditmer, “Asia in Transition,” 2.

      [19] Robert Willard, “Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, U.S. Navy Commander,
      U.S. Pacific Command,” before the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Pacific
      Command Posture, 28 February 2012): 6.

      [20] Ditmer, “Asia in Transition,” 2.

      [21] Free Pacific, U.S. Forward-Deployed Diplomacy Coming to a Pacific Location Near You (October 20, 2011) [internet]; available from pacific.

      [22] Willard, “Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard.” 4.

      [23] U.S. Forward-Deployed Diplomacy. 1

      [24] McCleary, “Westward expansion,” 12.

      [25] U.S. Forward-Deployed Diplomacy. 1

      [26] Tol and Krepenevich, “Air-Sea Battle,” xv.

      [27] Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Airpower, Spacepower, and Cyberpower,” Joint Force Quarterly, 60 (1st Quarter, 2011).

      [28] Ibid, 48.

      [29] Tol and Krepenevich, “Air-Sea Battle,” xv.


  1. Why AMERICA should be fear. They are aware that all these weapons are made in CHINA. ? The author should post 2 American weapons that CHINA should FEAR. When China made some moves in disputed islands, when American give comments from their activities. Chinese vesels retreat. Such a trash ambition.



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